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Patent law will always be a unique crossover of the legal
field with scientific and engineering disciplines. As computer
technology takes its place in the landscape of civilization, patent
law has had an increasingly difficult time keeping pace with the
revolution.' The parallel development of internet technology,
particularly e-business, has further compounded the problem2
by adding another non-legal field of expertise into patent law
while at the same time, raising the monetary stakes. Only
recently has software programming gained adequate recognition
as patentable subject matter! With the relatively recent
' SeeNotice of Roundtable on Computer-Implemented Business Method Patent
Issues, 65 Fed. Reg. 38811, 38812 (Dep't Commerce June 22, 2000). While the
background of the notice does not explicitly admit problems in keeping up with
technological demands, the notice does acknowledge exponential growth and
includes reference to industry outreach and quality programs. Even the calling of a
public roundtable on these issues addresses at least a perception of problems within
the PTO in dealing with emerging E-Business patent issues. See William C. Smith,
Patent This!, A.BA.. J., Mar. 2001, at 48, 52-54.
2 See supra note 1.
3 See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
- -"'~-~-- A
collapse of the business method exception to patent subject
matter4 and the curtailed application of the mathematical
algorithm exception to software,5 what is to be done with e-
business inventions and more importantly, why?
II. Legal Background
A. Deconstructing the Old Approach
In past years, challenges to business methods or
computer programming relied on the lack of statutory subject
matter as a basis for denying patents.6 The Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), however, requires only "that the
subject matter sought to be patented be a 'usefiul' invention"
and in explanation, "any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter under the sun that is
made by man is the proper subject matter of a patent."7 The
batde over statutory subject matter is limited to what is useful in
a patent sense. The PTO limits exclusions to the three
traditional exceptions of abstract ideas, laws of nature, and
See infira note 26 and accompanying text.
See infia note 25.
At the district court level, State Street was decided on exactly these misconceived
subject matter exclusion arguments. See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525
U.S. 1093 (1999).7 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478,
7481 (Dep't Commerce Feb. 28, 1996) (basing language on Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-309 (1908)).
natural phenomena.' Business methods and mathematical
algorithms are not statutorily excluded.
The mathematical algorithm exception has a clear but
twisted path and cannot be attributed to misinterpretation and
summarily dismissed. The algorithm exception was born in case
law involving an elementary computer program used to convert
between numeric codes.9 It was viewed as too basic a tool for
patent because it would unfairly limit further use of
computers. This was the case in 1972, because computer
programming was limited to abstract mathematical concepts,
properly viewed as mere abstractions. As computer
programming became more complex, the algorithm exception
was strained and revised by the Supreme Court." In 1978, the
federal circuit court interpretations introduced new standards,
which in turn were strained and revised.' 2 In 1994, the federal
circuit court, sitting en banc, returned to a simpler statutory
8 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481
(citations omitted).
' See Chad King, Note: Abort, Retry, Faik Protection for Software-RelatedInventions
in the Wake ofState Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 85
CORNELL L. REv. 1118, 1131(2000) (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972) as the fountainhead of "the newest of the Supreme Court's patentability
exceptions").
'0 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67.
" See King, supra note 9, at 1131-34 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63;
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); and Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175
(1981)); and John A. Gibby, Software Patent Developments: A Programmer's
Perspective, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH L.J. 293, 297-324 (1997) (citing
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584; and Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175).
2 See King, supra note 9, at 1134-38 (citing In re Freeman, 573 F. 2d 1237
(C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Walter, 618 F. 2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); and In reAbele,
684 F. 2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
reading initially suggested by the Supreme Court."3 The Alappat
algorithm test requires processes, explicitly including computer
programs, to be looked at as a whole14. As for computer
programs, "[s]uch programming creates a new machine, because
a general purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose
computer once it is programmed to perform particular functions
pursuant to instructions from program software." 5 In relation
to e-business software, the complexity and functionality
prevents application of the mathematical algorithm exception.
The business method exception was born in dicta in
1908.16 While statutory subject matter differed by definition in
that time, the Hotel Security case relied on terms that were not
confined to subject matter. The opinion rested on the idea that
"if the [invention] described in the specification be old, the
claims cannot be upheld because of novelty in the appliances
used in carrying it out, -- for the reason that there is no
novelty." 7 Later in the opinion, the court commented that
"[t]he essential features were old."1 8 In alternate justification,
the court was "of the opinion that the improvements ... [were]
such as would occur to anyone conversant in the business."1 9
"See King, supra note 9, at 1140 (citing In reAlappat, 33 F. 3d 1526 (Fed. Cir.
1994) (en banc)); and Gibby, supra note 11, at 326-330 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.
3d 1526).
,' Gibby, supra note 11, at 328 (citing In re Alappat, 33 F. 3d 1526).
'In reAlappat, 33 F. 3d at 1545 (citations omitted).
16 See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1376 (citing Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467 (2d
Cir. 1908) as "the case frequently cited as establishing the business method
exception").
,
7 HotelSecurity, 160 F. at 469. It should also be noted that this quote lays a very
strong foundation for both a method of analysis and a substantive basis of rejection
for all pure automation claims.
HotelSeurity, 160 F. at 470.
9 Id. at 471.
0=6 Ii .I.,  i9
Squarely and certainly, the case was decided on novelty, and
only in misinterpretation raised an idea of the business method
exception. Interestingly, the words of the 1908 case implicate
the issue of novelty in patenting computer automations.
Business models must still meet statutory subject matter
restrictions. A business concept shown to be a mere abstract
idea remains unpatentable.
In retrospect, neither exception appeared fimdamentally
defective in its time. The mathematical algorithm exception
made perfect sense in the era where computer programming
involved only simple number manipulation and demanded
minimal inventive skill. Today, the programming in question
requires the complex fusion of inventive design and creative
logic manipulation. While historic inventions were honed in
mechanical media, modern inventors are using software as their
alternative media of choice. The algorithm exception has shown
itself woefuUy inept at sorting "invention" from abstract ideas,
laws of nature, and natural phenomena." While the exclusion
of business methods as abstract ideas contained seeds of wisdom
in Hotel Security in 1908, computer software as mere algorithms
appeared analogously doomed in the early 1970's. It had been
well established by the Supreme Court that abstract ideas alone
were not patent worthy topics as early as 1874.21 While the
patent subject matter statute provided patent protection only to
"any new and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition
of matter," the mere mention of business methods excited
notions of a new exception. Alternatively, there was judicial
discomfort in recognizing business methods as the fruit of
invention, and even without an official recognition, business
20 See supra, notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
2' Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874).
" U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p.338 2 (1897).
methods were continually rejected by the courts on other
grounds." Today, the advent of electronic commerce has
brought new attention to both failed exceptions. In particular,
the PTO has had to directly address the means by which
inventions of computer-implemented business methods are to
be examined for patent.24 Rightfully, analytic focus is shifting
away from the narrowly viewed subject matter tests to the more
relevant questions of real claim scope, novelty, and obviousness.
B. Building the New Approach
In 1998 the court of appeals's State Street opinion
restricts use of the "mathematical algorithm exception" and
generally allows software with practical utility.25 State Street
also quashes the "business method exception. "2' Numerous
' See State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1375-76.
"Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, supra note 7.
25 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375. See Examination Guidelines for Computer-
Related Inventions, supra note 7 at 7481 (allowing "'functional descriptive material'
consist[ing] of data structures and computer programs which impart functionality
when encoded on a computer-readable medium ... [and] it becomes structurally
and functionally interrelated to the medium"); and King, supra note 9 (explaining
the twisted evolution to the current test as formulated by In reAlappat). See, e.g.,
Indira Saladi, Computer Software: Patentable Subject Matter Jurisprudence Comes of
Age, 18 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER& INFO. L. 113 (1999); Vincent Chiapetta,
Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as a 'Article ofManufacture: "Software
as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALLJ. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 89 (1998);
and Gibby, supra note 11.
26State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377 (quoting Examination Guidelines for Computer-
Related Inventions, supra note 7 at 7479). Several sources have identified and
expounded upon the prominent removal of business method exclusions from the
1996 publication of the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE. See
Rinaldo Del Gallo III, Are 'Methods ofDoing Business" Finally Out ofBusiness as a
Statutory Reection?, 38 IDEA 403, 404 (1998). Furthermore, both cases and
commentaries have noted the lack of business method exceptions in binding
articles have included the State Street case as a watershed case in
computer-implemented business methods. In the three years
since decided, the State Street decision has been included in six
(6) citing decisions and 122 law reviews and periodicals.27
For purposes of this note, it is important only to review
the step-wise logic used in State Street to arrive at the modern
state of computer-implemented business method law. First, the
patent was claimed on a system of calculation and
maintenance,28 not on the underlying investment tool. The
system did rely on the basic economic concept of efficiency by
aggregation of resources, but did not claim this abstract idea or
law of nature as its invention. Second, the patent as issued
involved only machine claims, with all method claims
dropped.2 ' By claiming the system of calculations as a machine,
the invention followed the theory and guidelines for claiming
software programming." Third, "the Freeman-Walter-Abele
analysis has limited application in determining the presence of
statutory subject matter."" The court supported and used the
precedent. (State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 ("The business method exception has
never been invoked by this court, or [it's predecessor], to deem an invention
unpatentable," citing Del Gallo, supra note 11, at 435, then differentiating several
cases and examples)); and King supra note 9, at 1144-45 (citing and explaining a
string of legal criticisms of the business method exception).)
27 Lexis Shepardize® results as of April, 18, 2001 (on file with the NORTH
CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY).
2 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371.
29Id.
-' Programming changes the general use machine to a special purpose machine.
(Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, supra note 7 at 7481
("computer programs which impart functionality when encoded on a computer-
readable medium ... [become] structurally and functionally interrelated to the
medium").)
3, State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374 (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, (C.C.P.A.
1978); In reWalter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); and In reAbele, 684 F.2d 902
(C.C.P.A. 1982)). This test is cited from In re Pardo, 684 F.2d 912, 915
AlappaP2 test" as embryonically envisioned by the language of
Diehr.' As a group, Diehr, Alappat and State Street permanently
include software in patent subject matter. Fourth, subject
matter must take into account the whole of what is claimed."
Fifth, the examination of statutory subject matter claims should
be foremost concerned with "the essential characteristics of the
subject matter, in particular, its practical utility,"6 and allow
categorization to be a minor secondary concern.'7 Finally, §101
does not exclude business methods, but §§102, 103, and 112
38
may.
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (further citations omitted) as articulated within that decision:
"First, ...determine whether a mathematical algorithm is directly or indirectly
recited. Next, ... the claim as a whole is further analyzed to determine whether the
algorithm is 'applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps,' and if it
is, it 'passes muster under §101.'"
32 In reAlappat, 33 F. 3d at 1544.
"' State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1374-75. The Alappat subject matter test as refined, can be articulated as to
allow a statutory subject matter claim on any invention which produces a "useful,
concrete and tangible result" from its operation.
' Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (in turn citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. at 70).
-" State Street, 149 F.3d at 1374 n.6 (citing Diehr, 450 U.S. at 192).
"State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.
' This idea forces the analysis of computer automations of known processes out of
the subject matter inquiry where they had been mishandled for years (see supra
notes 6-24 and accompanying text for historic discussion of origins of business
method and mathematical algorithm exceptions) and into investigation of novelty
and obviousness. "Today, we hold that the transformation of data, ... by a
machine through a series of mathematical calculations ... constitutes a practical
application ... because it produces 'a useful, concrete, and tangible result.'" State
Street, 149 F.3d at 1373.
The court is quite clear on this point. "The business method exception has never
been invoked by this court, or [its predecessor], to deem an invention
unpatentable." State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 (citing Del Gallo, supra note 26, at
435). Procedurally, the court of appeals has review authority over questions of law,
and as such, de novo review authority over claim and statutory construction. See
TS..11a11.11 II 1111 I
In all, State Street appears to follow the PTO's 1996
Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions.
Both decisively limit the mathematical algorithm exception as
developed by Freeman- Walter-Abele to those claims falling
outside of the Alappat functional-output test,39 while State Street
points out that in most or even all cases, the inquiry is
altogether unnecessary." So an early inquiry must be made
whether "the subject matter sought to be patented [is] a useful
invention 4 1 as a whole based on "its ractical utility"4 and "a
useful, concrete, and tangible result" without regard to
particular exceptions.
also State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370(relating to similar authority in summary
judgement). The court's opinion relied on claim and statutory construction but
remanded the case for proceedings at the district court. It seems that the court of
appeals read the district court opinion as complete in regards to fact, but inaccurate
in developing a coherent and logical basis for rejecting the patent. The court of
appeals quotes and supports an important and essential finding of fact which points
to the claim being overbroad. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1376-77. Then for the
world to see, "[w]hether the patent's claims are too broad to be patentable is not to
be judged under §101, but rather under §§102, 103, and 112." State Street, 149
F.3d at 1377 (referring to statutory sections of 35 U.S.C. (1996) revised (2001)
(changing no relevant matter)). Admonishing further, "it has nothing to do with
whether what is claimed is statutory subject matter." State Street, 149 F.3d at 1377.
" See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373-74; and Examination Guidelines for
Computer-Related Inventions, supra note 7, at 7479.
'
0 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 n.4.
Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, supra note 7, at 7481.
Overall, the Guidelines couch this inquiry in terms of machine and process
functionality, not the results as in Diehr and State Street. The Guidelines,
(ironically in this comparison) have been criticized for following form over function
in requiring that computer instructions must be encoded on physical media such as
a floppy disk in order to avoid labeling as an abstract idea. See Chiappetta, supra
note 25, at 113. If, however, this thin line provides the bright line of predictable
separation, e-business inventors should be satisfied for a few years. Alas, this
differentiation, too, seems to be doomed to antiquity.
412 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375.
'
3 Id. at 1373.
The practical utility requirement will go hand in hand
with the description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112. In particular, the specification must "particularly [point]
out and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant
regards as his invention."' The tendency has been to write
claims as broadly as possible either to make them easier to
understand,45 or to broaden the scope of the claim as much as
allowable.
The novelty condition for patentability is embodied in
35 U.S.C. §102. In summary, the invention must be
something not already introduced. Computer programs have
found this to be a problem, as a mere automation of a known
process should be considered lacking in novelty.46 Anticipation
requires identical elements found in the identical situation
related in the same way all within one prior art reference.
47
The non-obvious condition for patentability is embodied
in 35 U.S.C. § 103. An invention not exactly embodied in prior
art may not be patented "if the differences between the subject
'35 U.S.C. §112 (2000).45EDMUND W. KITCH & HARVEYS. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYAND
UNFAIR COMPETITION 998 (5th ed. 1998).
46 The automation of existing processes has long been peripherally recognized as
either not novel or obvious. "If the ['invention'] described in the specification [is
not new], the claims cannot be upheld because of the novelty in the appliances used
in carrying it out, - for the reason that there is no novelty." Hotel Security
Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. at 469. Similarly, a system for "automatic
record-keeping" was struck down in Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
Recent law review articles point to Justice Stevens's dissent in Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, to show that a mere automation should not be considered requisitely
inventive. Gibby, supra note 25, at 316; and Saladi, supra note 25, at 139.
47 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1239
(W.D. Wash. 1999) (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732
F.2d 888, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). The anticipation requirement is a very high
standard to meet, and was ultimately dropped. See Amazon.com, Inc. v.
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
matter ... and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art."48
Obviousness requires both factual and legal determinations.
The factual inquires include: "(1) the scope and content of the
prior art; (2) the differences between the prior art and the
claims; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and (4)
applicable secondary considerations,"" including "commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] previous failures of
others.""
III. Attack of the Amazons (.com)
Amazon.com's original case requested-preliminary
injunctive relief enjoining Barnesandnoble.com (BN.com) from
using the patented5' "one-click" purchasing process ("one-click"
patent). Plaintiffs presented their patent describing "[a] method
and system for placing an order to purchase an item via the
Internet" using a significantly streamlined process52 and
presented evidence regarding the allegedly infringing method of
BN.com. BN.com's main defense questioned Amazon.com's
likelihood of success at trial on the merits. BN.com argued 1)
the "one-click" patent is invalid based on obviousness and
4 35 U.S.C. § 103.
49Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (citing Weatherchem Corp. v. J.L. Clark,
Inc., 163 F. 3d 1326, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
'0Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1241-42 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966)). Further cited isArkieLures Tnc. v. Gene Larew Tackle, Inc.,
119 F. 3d 953, 957 (Fed. Cir. 1997), which adds commercial success, licensing,
and copying as evidence of nonobviousness.
"' U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999).
12IId at 1.
anticipation, 2) BN.com's method did not infringe the patent,
and 3) the patent was unenforceable.53 In the alternative,
BN.com "argued that Amazon.com could not demonstrate
irreparable harm, that the balance of hardships did not tip in
Amazon.com's favor, and that the public interest" did not
justify an injunction."
A. Relief at the District Court
The District Court for the Western District of
Washington began with a finding that the patent only applied
to single-action ordering, and in particular, without a
"shopping-cart" model." Evidence regarding non-obviousness
included uncontested testimony that the method was highly
innovative," addressed a long felt, "unsolved need,"' 7 and met
with commercial success." Dr. Lockwood, a key expert for the
defense, had never thought to streamline the purchasing
process." The commercial value and competitor response
compounded by difficulties in measuring the impact of
infringement and the value of customer loyalty supported the
finding of irreparable harm."0
Next, the district court acknowledged the numerous
relevant legal guidelines. "To obtain a preliminary injunction,
... a party must establish a right thereto in light of four factors:
(1) reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable
53Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.
Id at 1231-32.




59 Id at 1235-36.
6oI0 at 1237-38.
harm; (3) the balance of hardships tipping in its favor; and (4)
the impact of the injunction on the public interest."6' The
likelihood of success, in turn, depends on the defenses. In this
case, the defenses are non-infringement and invalidity.
"Analysis of patent infringement involves two steps: (1) claim
construction to determine what the claims cover, i.e., their
scope, followed by (2) determination of whether the properly
construed claims encompass the accused structure."62 "The
statutory presumption of validity, ... applies to all patents and is




This presumption holds unless the patent opponent raises a
"substantial question" against validity and the patent proponent
"fails to show the defense lacks 'substantial merit."'6S BN.com's
invalidity defense is further based on anticipation and
obviousness. Anticipation requires identical elements found in
the identical situation related in the same way all within one
prior art reference. 65 Obviousness "is based on several factual
inquires," focusing on questions of prior art, ordinary skill in
the art, and other considerations."
Finally, the holdings are revealed throughout the
opinion. As for infringement, the scope of the claim and the
questioned use overlapped, with the single-action requirement
6,Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1239
(quoting Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849 F.2d 1446, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
6Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1243 (quoting Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp.,
102 F.3d 524, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
6'Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (quoting Manivision, Inc., v. Bonneau Co.,
115 F.3d 956, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
'Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (quoting New England Braiding co. v.
A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F. 2d 878, 883(Fed. Cir. 1992)).
6 Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1239 (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.
Computervision Corp., 732 F. 2d 888, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
6 Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1241. See discussion supra notes 49-50 and
accompanying text.
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crucial in finding an infringement.67 The likelihood of success
inquiries also favored Amazon.com. The legal standard used by
the court for anticipation challenges presented a very high
hurdle. As a result, the court summarily dismissed all prior art
references as not individually anticipating the claimed
invention. For obviousness, the court pointed out several items
of fact. Mainly through rehashing the inferences of prior art
and secondary considerations, the court showed that BN.com
may have raised questions of validity bordering on substantial,
but Amazon.com was able to show that they were without
serious merit.68 Also critical to the obviousness inquiry was the
testimony of Dr. Lockwood, defendant's expert witness, "that it
had never occurred to him" to modify existing purchasing
methods in the manner of the "one-click" invention. 9 BN.com
dropped arguments relating to enforceability." In the end, the
district court granted the preliminary injunction.
B. Review at the Court of Appeals
BN.com adjusted its positions for the appeal. BN.com
asserted that the scope of the claim may have only one
interpretation for both the infringement finding and for the
validity finding. BN.com asserted that under such a reading,
the "one-click" claim is either too broad to be valid, or too
narrow to include the BN.com method.7' In short, BN.com
claimed its method was finore like prior art than the patent.
BN.com argued their method was either outside the scope of the
6Id at 1244.
6'Id. at 1241-42.
69 Iad at 1241.
70 Id at 1242.7 1Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351.
"one-click" patent, or alternatively within the scope of an
invalid patent because of the teachings of prior art. BN.com
also asserted that the district court's error was compounded by
its misunderstanding of the teachings of prior art.72
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit followed a
very different approach in its opinion - at times showing
potential contradictions in the controlling case law. First, the
court restates a preliminary injunction rule very similar to the
district court.7' The court points out "[tihese factors, taken
individually, are not dispositive; rather, the district court must
weigh and measure each factor against the other factors and
against the form and magnitude of the relief requested."7 4 The
next paragraph supports the presumption of irreparable harm in
patent infringement cases.' This is the last mention of
presumed irreparable harm. The next paragraph following, the
court relies on case law and logic, which is never expounded or
explained, to require the movant to establish the first two
factors, i.e., likelihood of success at trial and irreparable harm.76
The court continues to put the burden of showing likely success
on the movant, even thought the movant has an examined and
issued patent. Very quickly the injunction test transforms from
balancing to threshold, disregards the presumption of
irreparable harm, and shifts and increases the burden of proof to
the holder of an officially obtained patent.'
7'Id at 1352.
id at 1350.
74Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350 (quoting Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 849
F.2d at 1451).75 '
77SeeAmazon.com, 239 F.3dat 1351. See discussion infra notes 110-114 and
accompanying text.
Next, the court of appeals shifts its terminology from
likelihood of success and irreparable harm to new standards
comprising only some of the crucial elements of the old. The
court begins to discuss the analysis in terms of infringement and
validity (previously sub-parts of the likelihood of success
element).78 The reworking and regrouping of the law then
follows a very logical and streamlined approach, recognizing the
similar elements of the inquiries and condensing the standards.79
The court's analysis focuses exclusively on the likelihood of
success, without regard for the procedural context. The most
important individual inquiry for both the infringement and
validity analyses is the scope of the claim.8"
The court interprets the scope of the claim in a way
similar to the district court's method,81 resulting in a similar
finding of likely infringement.82 The court of appeals reaches a
very different conclusion from the obviousness inquiry. In the
end, the court of appeals found that "one of ordinary skill in the
art could fill in the gaps in the asserted references given, the
opportunity to do so at trial."83 The district court misread and
misinterpreted the teaching of the prior art references,m and
BN.com had gone far enough in challenging the validity to
overcome the motion for a preliminary injunction." The most
important prior art seemed to be a description of an "Instant
Buy Option" briefly noted in an appendix of Magdalena Yesil's
Creating the Virtual Store e-business how-to book,
78Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1350-51.
79I d at 1350-52.
80 Id





undiscovered before the district trial.86 Some or even most of
Amazon.com's assertions concerning non-obviousness are
addressed and dismissed by the court.' Perhaps the most
important of the dismissed bases is the conclusion that
individuals skilled in the art could not have invented the "one-
click" invention." While the district court did use Dr.
Lockwood's testimony in deciding the obviousness issue,89 it did
not use his testimony exclusively. The district court used the
cross-examination admissions mainly in impeaching prior
inconsistent testimony regarding "conclusory statements that
prior art references teach to one of ordinary skill in the art."90
Further, at least one other expert (from a very limited number of
testifying experts1 ) testified that those skilled in the art would
not have discovered this invention.92
The overall methodology looks perfectly reasonable at
first glance. This analysis, however, forces a focused review on
the substance of the patent, disregarding the procedural context.
Ironically, the court of appeals points out that the district court
used terms indicating a legal conclusion on infringement instead
of the substantial likelihood of infringement necessary for an
injunction.3 The two cases resolve the conflict by placing
burdens on opposite parties and using different methods and
m See infra, note 127 and accompanying text.
87 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1360-66. The
court addresses each of the prior art references, but addresses all of the "secondary
considerations" in two condusory paragraphs at 1366.
'"8Id at 1364.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
90 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236.
9,SeeAmazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
92 Id at 1241.
93 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1356.
standards for preliminary injunctions. The differences raise very
general questions regarding expectations of patent protections.
IV. The Harbinger of Bad News
A. "Functionality" and "Utility"
The first problem, although not arising within the
Amazon.com context, underscores the glaring and inevitable
vagueness of the functionality inquiry. Some mathematical
algorithms are still not within statutory subject matter. Section
10 1 still hinges on the § 112 requirement that the claimed
invention must be usable as explained within the claim
description.94 Between theorems and working machines, rests
the line to be drawn for patent worthiness. Everything we
comprehend has abstract and concrete elements. Somewhere
between the purely abstract and the purely concrete, lay all
patent applications.95 Somewhere in that range is a division
between concepts of multiple and general use and those of
independent utility. Mr. Gibby's article adeptly explores this
problem in developing the concept of a continuum in the scope
and utility analyses. Currently, PTO Examination Guidelines
for Computer-Related Inventions develop only a partly
workable guideline as to sorting the "functional descriptive
material" from the "non-functional descriptive material."96
94See 35 U.S.C. §112.
9' See Gibby, supra note 11, at 299-355.
Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, supra note 7, at 748 1-
82.
''I t~ r - .1 M
A real standardized test for functionality must be inferred
from the utility test provisions finalized in January of 2001.°9
The Computer-Related Guidelines require the claim to provide
only one practical application to pass the utility requirement."
Examiners are to focus on finding statements in the
specification which lead to practical applications, providing no
real threshold for the subject matter or the scope of claims.
With such a loose standard the current iteration ofl§§ 12 and
101 would provide too easy an access to the patent examination
process. To what level of reality must a postulated application
rise to pass the practicality test? In particular, the real
practicality of software applications will vary widely.
Conversely, the Utility Guidelines are a great improvement,
allowing a "well-established utility" to meet a "specific,
substantial, and credible" standard." The Utility Guidelines
strengthen the link between §101 and 112.100
The problem still exists, however, because the
Computer-Related Guidelines and the Utility Guidelines are
comparing apples and oranges. The Computer-Related
Guidelines never address the issue of utility where the invention
is claiming non-functional descriptive material. Without a
criterion for determining the functionality, the standard is very
subjective and will allow claims to slowly creep from the overly
restrictive business method and algorithm exceptions toward
truly "anything under the sun."'' The judgement of
Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Dep't Commerce Jan. 5,
2001).98 Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, supra note 7, at 7479-
80.
"Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 97, at 1098.
10 Id.
"'o Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 308-309 (interpreting Congressional intent
of the open language of the 35 U.S.C. §101 subject matter requirement).
"functional utility" will have a strong impact on determining
the "practical application" and will, in turn, impact the
statutory subject matter finding - while "utility" has new found
meaning, "functionality" has not. The real possibility exists that
e-business inventions will show utility to pass §112 (and
presumably §10 1) under the Utility Guidelines and yet not
show the level of operative functionality truly contemplated by
§101 but not standardized in the Computer-Related Guidelines.
Currently, the inference is that if the claimed invention
has a postulated practical application and is on a disk, it passes
%§101 and 112. Admittedly, part of this observation relies on a
reading of State Street which virtually abandons the F-W-A test.
The abandonment of the F-W-A test, however, is supported by
the Utility Guidelines which do not address those algorithms
that meet process definitions and showing specific, substantial
and credible utility, but still remain pure abstract ideas or
natural laws. If e-business invention claims move slowly toward
the abstract as mentioned, the F-W-A test stands a real chance
of being erroneously undermined and lost. In the Amazon.com
cases, both courts interpreting the scope of the claims came to
similar conclusions. 02 Because no significant differences arose
in interpreting the scope of the claims and the matter concerned
business software with both clear practical application and true
functional utility, the greater problem continued unrecognized.
B. Computer Terminology and the Unwary
Computer based retailing appears to have become
independent from traditional business methods. With that
separate life has come an assumption that traditional and virtual
102Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1358.
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retailing are unrelated. Especially in cases of emerging
technology, other sources of prior art must be included in
evaluating obviousness and anticipation. 10 3 Perhaps
Amazon.com's legal team achieved their greatest success when
focusing the terminology for the single, key claim term: "one-
dick." While applicants have the general freedom to define
their own terms in claims, other terms can and should be used if
arising in prior art. Here, "one-click" was compared to the
"shopping cart" model exclusively and apparently without
challenge. Barnesandnoble.com contentedly and narrow-
mindedly limited its obviousness showing by relying entirely on
computer based prior art. Would real-world shopping carts
have been used as prior art against the "shopping cart" model?
Does even the act of comparing of the "one-click" method to
the "shopping cart" model imply that "one-click is a mere
automation?
If the "one-click" model had been challenged as a mere
automation of a real-world "room service" model, or a
restaurant "tab" model, perhaps the district court would have
reached the obviousness conclusion later found at the court of
appeals. After all, it's a pretty sure bet that someone among the
court personnel can call in pre-selected lunch items to the local
deli, which fulfills orders based on its method of recognizing
certain customers. From here, the "servers" and "clients" and
"cookies" all fall into their respective analogous places. The
introduction of non-computer precedents may have demystified
the claims of computer-wizardry, and expanded the realm of
prior art to achieve the obviousness showing more efficiently.
103 See Gibby, supra note 11, at 353.
C. Who Is an "E-Commerce Expert" and How Is the
Job Market?
The most dramatic difference in the opinions centered
on the obviousness issue. The court of appeals raised and left
unanswered an interesting and specific legal issue when noting
the district court's reliance on a single expert in its anticipation
analysis. 1 4 The observer must ponder the question of which
skills and what level of skill should be assigned to "a
hypothetical ordinarily skilled artisan"' working to implement
internet business methods by developing computer programs.
Simply, who is an ordinary skilled artisan for e-
commerce? Computer-implemented business methods require
the combination of individually esoteric skills into a single,
modern, skilled internet business-expert and computer-
programmer. What about inventions which would only be
anticipated by a combination of artisans skilled in different
fields? For "one-click", one artisan skilled in business dreamt up
the idea, and other artisans skilled in programming diligently
reduced it to practice. °6 Neither would have succeeded
independently.
As for Dr. Lockwood, the "typical" expert, 7 he is a
programmer, not accustomed to generating business strategy.
As for Magdalena Yesil, the critical business developer, 0 8 she is
104 Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1364. "[Tihe district court apparently based its
conclusion of nonobviousness on Dr. Lockwood's 'admission' that he personally
never thought of combining or modifying the prior art to come up with the
claimed 'single action' invention."105 Id.
10
6 See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
10
7 See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1240.
'08 SeeAmazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1364-65.
an author and business artisan. She did not have the capacity to
describe her "Instant Buy Option" invention to any greater
technical expertise. So to find the properly skilled artisan, we
must first look to the relevant business artisan in asking whether
(given the prior art and current circumstances), the business
solution was obvious and the invention was therefore taught by
previous reference. Then we may ask if (given the relevant
predetermined business need), would a software engineer have
anticipated the means of execution. If it can be said that
computer programmers can program virtually anything given
enough time,' the act of reducing a process to computer
instruction becomes irrelevant, as the creative expression rests
entirely with the business person. That is not to say, however,
that no situation may exist in which the method of execution of
the process provides a level of uniqueness warranting the
attention and protection of patent. These questions are
appropriate at the examiner level and the claims should be
rejected or modified accordingly. Dealing with the compound-
skilled-artisan and the broad range of expertise presents a
formidable task for PTO examiners.
D. The Injunction Balancing Act
Injunctive relief requires the application of a balancing
test."' If instead, the court of appeals decides the case based
entirely on two of the four factors, what inferences can be
drawn? It should already be clear that problems arise where the
court of appeals moves from review of the injunction to the
109 "Given enough time, a skilled programmer should be able to program a
computer to do anything that has been done before mechanically." Gibby, supra
note 11, at 316.
,, See supra notes 61 and 73-74 and accompanying text.
substantive matter of the patent. Even if the court of appeals
has de novo review authority of both legal and factual issues,"' itdi " 112
may still defer to the district court if logic, justice, or another
strong reason dictates. Such is the case here, where BN.com was
able to manipulate the system by trying the merits of the patent
at the appeal level first, while still preserving a direct attack of
the patent at the district level.
Where the court of appeals has determined the
impropriety of injunctive relief based solely on the validity
question, little remains to litigate. This effectively undermines
the patent. Normally, injunctive relief should protect the patent
until a full hearing on the merits can be fairly litigated. Such
injunctive relief must favor patent-holders in order to protect
the validity and potency of the entire patent system. While the
court of appeals decision can be interpreted to mean only that
the non-movants had met an initial burden to be further tested
in a trial on the merits, the court was not explicit when it could
have been and precedent"3 dictates another conclusion. Because
absolutely no weight is given to the possibility of irreparable
harm, the balance of hardships, or the impact of the injunction
on the public interest, the decision infers that the patent should
not withstand later judicial scrutiny.
Imagine Amazon.corn defending a preliminary
injunction and relying on a traditional balancing test. It would
", See supra note 38.
112 Such a situation was presented in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, to the same court, only three years earlier.
That decision was remanded to the district court for a trial on the merits.
"' Both the district court and the court of appeals acknowledge the assumption of
validity where a patent has been issued. (See supra notes 63 and 75 and
accompanying text.) Such an issued patent and the examination process it has
undergone should be accorded some weight in both the irreparable harm and
likelihood of success elements of the injunctive relief balancing test.
make sense to advocate the injunction by distributing precious
legal resources to elements other than the likelihood of success.
Amazon.com relied on the intrinsic weight of patent
examination to help bolster its validity argument and the court
of appeals used a different standard. Amazon.com expected a
certain procedural context but was ambushed by a trial on the
merits of the patent.
Even if there is a reasonable question of patent validity
due to obviousness at a hearing for preliminary injunction (or
even blatantly obvious to the court of appeals), policy dictates
protecting the expectation of validity of issued patents. Some
patent applications will pass the PTO's obviousness
investigation and be issued, only to be proven later to be
obvious and cancelled. This truth comes to the front at times
when old standards are broken down, and the prior art on file at
the PTO proves inadequate for some interval. Recently, the
business-method and mathematical algorithm exceptions have
become defimct, and there is a real issue regarding the PTO's
ability to update its information for the proper examination of
computer implemented business method invention
applications. 114 The proper method of addressing this temporal
deficiency, however, is not to change the judicial standard, or
repeal long-standing presumptions regarding elements of major
guidelines. The PTO will very quickly correct the problem, and
substantive challenges to patents will serve justice appropriately.
In fact, complete and proper challenges at the district level
arguably provide the best way to protect the patent system
against infirm and unconvincing claims until the PTO has
recovered.
14 See Smith, Patent This!, supra note 1.
E. The Sands of the Hourglass
In law, changes are measured in decades. In e-business,
changes are measured by the flickering fractions on Wall Street.
So how does change affect patent law decisions? Professor
Dreyfuss's policy arguments115 provide insightfil keys with
which to evaluate the changed landscape between the two
Amazon.com decisions.
"The general lesson here is this. What judges don't
understand, they think is patentable - there is a kind of 'gee wiz'
[sic] factor that is hard to overcome. In contrast, what judges
do understand (or think they should pretend they understand),
appears obvious."" 6 As much as Dr. Lockwood cannot be
considered the relevant skilled artisan because he is only one
person, patent validity cannot rest on the knowledge of
individual members of the court. Everyone has witnessed the
greater than exponential growth numbers for PC sales and
internet subscriptions and users. All things considered, there is
no accurate way to determine the improvement in general
computer knowledge between May of 1997'7, and February 14,
200118. As for the judges on the court of appeals, however, the
district court opinion was cited in at least eight (8) law review
articles in 2000."9 This number does not account for the public
15 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000).
116 Id at 270.
11' Date before which the "one-click" patent was conceived according to finding of
fact at the district court Amazon.corn, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F.
Supp. 2d 1228, 1232.
18 Date of decision by court of appeals. Amazon.corn, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1343.
"' Lexis Shepardize® results as ofApril 18, 2001 (on file with the NORTH
CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY).
outcry or the numerous newspaper, magazine and other media
expositions of the "one-dick" technology. The court of appeals
developed interest in computer-related knowledge. In
particular, the district court never uses the term "cookie" but
does take time to carefully explain "client" and "server"
systems. 120 In contrast, the court of appeals shows much greater
ease with the related terminology. 121 Obviousness is to be
judged at the time of invention, and not at application, trial, or
appeal.'2 For common inventions in the mechanical field (for
example, a mousetrap), the state of the art does not change
much in four years to have any real impact. The growth of
computer knowledge in the general and judicial communities,
however, begs questions concerning the impact of such growth
on the obviousness inquiry, especially when the answer changes
from the injunction ruling to the appeal ruling.
The Dreyfuss article describes another change. "Sticky
business methods" are those that foster loyalty and return
shopping.'3 In particular, Dreyfuss uses the Amazon.com "one-
click" system as an example of consumers developing a bias for
one of two highly similar and competing businesses based on
style and convenience. "[O]nce a book buyer has entered
information at Amazon, there is no reason to go elsewhere ...
shoppers will not likely visit a site that is less informative and
requires more work."' 24 In recognition that the typical shopper
"
0 Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
"' The court of appeals uses the terms "cookie" and "menu" at 1363, "link" several
times, including at 1354, and general (if only basic) comprehension of server and
client systems. SeeAmazon.com, 239 F.3d 1343
" "The law is clear that the time period for any obviousness determination is 'at the
time the invention was made.'" Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1241 (citing 35
U.S.C. § 103(a), further citations omitted).
12 Dreyfuss, supra note 115, at 270-273.
14 id at 271.
will not recognize proprietary or patented conveniences,
"[b]uyers ... will not care if the patent is invalidated."'25
Amazon.com, however, would certainly not agree that this
cavalier attitude should apply to its patent. The underlying
common sense and clearly appropriate application of the idea to
the Amazon situation presents a problem in defending a patent
injunction. The passage of time during an injunction may
sooth the sting of irreparable harm for the court system, but
such rationalization is little comfort for the owners of the
overturned patent. The truth is that there is an opposite of
"stickiness" - the effect of non-stickiness must be considered.
Buyers not offered the ease of the patented system do have
reason to shift buying elsewhere from their current retailer. The
company whose patent is deemed to have done its job by
"sticking" existing customers quickly loses an attractive incentive
to competitors' customers considering switching brands. This
argument further buttresses the presumption of irreparable
harm in regards to this type of patent.
F. Policy - the Good, the Bad, and the Unfinished
Essentially, Amazon founder and CEO, Jeff Bezos,
developed an abstract idea'26 (which had possibly been
previously discovered 27), which was reduced to functional utility
12 5 
Id
126 The abstract idea being that quicker online sales make consumers feel safer, or at
least less likely to be dissuaded before completing online purchases.
127 Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1364-65 (citing
MAGDALENA YESIL, CREATING THE VIRTUAL STORE, App. F (1996)). The
material encompassing the idea was apparently not fully discovered and developed
before the presentation to the district court and dismissed without being adequately
addressed by the district court. Amazon.com, 239 F.3d at 1364. There were under
four weeks from the filing of the complaint to the beginning of the trial.
using several known computer sub-processes presumably by an
in-house software developer,s and implemented as "one-click."
In this case, the idea was described in various testimonies as "a
major innovation in on-line retailing," and "a huge leap from
what was done in the past."129 An abstract idea as such is not
patentable even if showing inventiveness, and is further
weakened if anticipated. The "one-click" arrangement of several
known processes had not been done before, and raises a new
and genuine issue. Where inventive novelty applies only to a
ripened abstract idea (because the best embodiment is
anticipated, obvious, or a mere automation), should the
resulting embodiment be protected by patent? If so, the
patentability of business methods has come full circle,
overcoming even the established and fundamental obstacle of
abstract ideas as subject matter. If not protected, has the patent
system failed to secure the discoveries of inventors and stifled
the "progress of science and useful arts" 3 ' by letting down the
entrepreneur and the public? Should new and useful
combinations of known sub-processes be patentable?
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1231.
Compared to the Bezos idea, this idea can be differentiated as a mere observation of
thepossibility of quicker checkouts, without the implication that such a process
would have practical utility. The court of appeals, however, points out "that a
reasonable jury could find that this passage provides a motivation" and in the total
light of other facts, "raises a substantial question of validity." Amazon.com, 239
F.3d at 1365 (emphasis added).
"s The patent (U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999)) lists Peri
Hartman, Jeffrey P. Bezos, Shel Kaphan, and Joel Spiegel as inventors while only
Bezos testified as to conceiving the idea. Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1232.
Shel Kaphan was also called to testify. Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1231.
12 Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-37 (omitting citations).
" Contrary to U.S. CONST. art. I §8, cl. 8.
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V. Conclusion
The "one-click" patent should not have been issued
because it did not meet the required non-obvious standard.
Once issued, however, the "one-click" patent should have been
supported by preliminary injunctions enjoining infringing uses
such as that of Barnesandnoble.com. While the court of appeals
did not use language causing drastic changes to major
precedent, it has unnecessarily and inappropriately widened the
use of appeal in future litigation. Injunctions are destined to be
appealed more frequently and will become the dispute of choice.
The correct suit brings challenge to the validity of the patent,
not the wisdom of the injunction. By allowing the merits of the
patent to be tried at the injunction appeal, the court of appeals
has provided infringing users a double chance to test the merits
of their claims.
The district court presumed irreparable harm when
issuing injunctions related to valid patents, 3' but the court of
appeals did not. Moreover, the court of appeals took
considerable time and effort in trying and analyzing the validity
of an issued patent. 3 2 By not recognizing the weight behind an
examined and issued patent and shifting the burden to the
patent holder (who has already shown validity to the satisfaction
of the PTO), the court undermined the protection and validity
of all issued patents. The court of appeals adopted an analysis
structure ignoring the weight of the patent process and virtually
ignoring irreparable harm as a factor in injunctions. As a result,
131 Amazon.com, 73 F. Supp. 2d at 1245-46.
132 Amazon.conm filed suit on October 21, 1999 and the district court opinion was
released on December 1, 1999 (under six weeks). The court of appeals decision was
released on February 14, 2001 (well over fourteen months after the injunction was
granted, and almost sixteen months after the original suit was filed).
the presumptions of irreparable harm and the validity of all
issued patents are questionable. Compared to (1) the
undermining of every existing patent, (2) abuse of the appeals
system, and (3) the tilting of the field to favor infringing users;
the erroneous granting of an injunction is certainly the least of
the competing evils.
The above discussion of problems in the post-subject-
matter-test standards support different conclusions, but basic
policy questions should have carried the day. There was little
reason for the court of appeals to overturn a mere injunction.
There are better ways to show the court's authority in validity
rulings. How can we enforce patents if injunctions cannot be
dependably relied on to protect patents until they are properly
litigated? The court of appeals did not apply the accepted
injunction standard but instead allowed the patent litigation to
proceed out of turn. The case became a challenge to the patent,
instead of a challenge to the injunction. For the sake of
efficiency and patent authority, Barnesandnoble.com should
have taken the pure validity and infringement arguments to the
district court instead of the court of appeals. Instead, by
appealing the injunction, Barnesandnoble.com was allowed to
litigate the merits of the patent through the back door.
Barnesandnoble.com should have gotten a stiff slap on the wrist
for wasting the court's time, and been forced to litigate the case
at the district court. If greater deference had been shown to the
district court and the issued patent (and a less interested ear
turned to the public outcry over a mere injunction), the case
could have been decided properly on its merits - invalidating
the patent while validating the system.
